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1. Summary 
The literature reviewed for this report suggests that a conducive policy and legal environment is 
important but not sufficient to progress in security and justice programming, and that a decision 
on how essential it is will be highly context-specific. Effective policy influence requires attention to 
a number of complementary factors, including: 
 the level of ownership within both state and society of the reform process; 
 the sequencing of reforms; 
 the skills and mechanisms which enable a rapid response to emerging opportunities; 
 the degree of trust and mutual interest that can be established between stakeholders; 
 the critical role played by individuals in influential positions, as well as the mechanisms to 
institutionalise those relationships in the interests of sustaining reform. 
Policy change is likely to require corresponding action to influence attitudes and behaviours and 
the social norms that underpin them if implementation is to be achieved. Moreover, conflict-
affected environments are inherently uncertain and unpredictable. For both these reasons a long-
term perspective is important, married to a sense of realism about what is possible to achieve in 
the short to medium term, as well as the capacity to adapt and respond flexibly when conditions 
allow. However, it is also possible for individuals – both within government and outside it – to 
push through reforms in inhospitable environments if they have the requisite skills, knowledge, 
and will to do so. 
The evidence base for security and justice programming in general is considered weak. 
Important gaps that are relevant to the focus of this paper include empirical evidence about how 
change occurs, and discussion of outcomes that are difficult to measure, such as changes in the 
incentives necessary to achieve and implement reforms. Reform processes tend to be analysed 
in general terms: if a specific policy or legislative change is discussed, the factors that 
contributed to that change are rarely explained. Gender is addressed primarily in terms of the 
specific issue of violence against women rather than as part of generic policy reforms.  
2. Introduction 
Policies and laws are part of the architecture that governs the security and justice system. 
Bakrania with Haider (2016, p.16) describe its three pillars and their importance: 
 National management and decision-making structures, such as National Security 
Councils, which coordinate decision-making across the various institutions that contribute 
to security management, within government and outside it. 
 National security policies and strategies. Policy development processes can be 
opportunities to instigate long-term change as well as entry points for identifying the 
security and justice assistance required. 
 Constitutional and legal provisions. Laws may be discriminatory, outdated, or 
incomplete, and in some cases may need bringing into line with constitutional provisions. 
The concepts of security and justice have imprecise boundaries since their outcomes are 
determined by a wide range of social, economic, and cultural factors (Bakrania with Haider, 
2016, p. 23; ICAI, 2015, p. 10; WYG, 2017a, p. 56). The likely policy reforms required are 
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therefore not necessarily limited to the security and justice sectors (Hendricksen, 2010, p. 211). 
Moreover, while security and justice are clearly core functions of the state, they are not exclusive 
to it. Most security and justice for ordinary people in Africa is not provided through the state 
(Detzner, 2017, p. 119), but rather through a range of institutions such as customary authorities 
or militias (Baker, 2010). Oversight is also shared: while formal oversight may in theory rest with 
parliaments, civil society contributes by facilitating public debate and by shaping and monitoring 
public policy (Bakrania with Haider, 2016, p.16). 
The evidence base for security and justice programming as a whole is generally considered 
weak (Jackson et al, 2019, p. 30). Specific gaps in the literature relevant to a discussion of policy 
and legal reform include the following: 
 Empirical evidence about success factors and about how change occurs, specifically how 
external interventions interact with local institutions and processes to influence outcomes 
(Bakrania with Haider, 2016, p. 23; Gisselquist, 2015, p. 1-2; Eckhard, 2016, p. 21) 
 Discussion of outcomes that are difficult to measure, such as changes in the political will 
necessary to enact reforms (Jackson et al, 2019, p. 8) 
 Evidence about how laws are interpreted, applied, and complied with, since what exists 
on paper may not reflect the empirical situation (Jackson, forthcoming, p. 6). 
This review has additional limitations. First, the literature tends to discuss reform processes in 
general terms rather than isolate particular policy or legislative changes, which are the focus of 
the research question. Second, while studies may describe activities that led to a particular 
reform, they rarely analyse how that change was achieved. Third, and with regard to the dilemma 
posed by the first part of the research question, the competing scenarios considered in 
programme design are rarely committed to paper and publicly available.1 
Some case studies of policy reforms and the conditions that made them possible were found in 
evaluation reports, and a selection of these are presented in section 5. However, reliable 
evidence of the impact of policy change, particularly the effectiveness of policy implementation, is 
unlikely to be evident within the life of a programme and therefore within the scope of its 
evaluation (WYG, 2017a, p. 55). There are also challenges associated with the evaluation of 
advocacy in general and security sector programming in particular, with the result that these 
issues are thinly represented in evaluation databases. For example: 
 An evidence gap mapping of impact evaluations associated with the five Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding Goals2 revealed little evidence in most categories, and no impact 
evaluations in the specific area of security sector reform (Cameron et al, 2015). 
 In their review of 56 evaluations of advocacy initiatives, Naeve et al (2017) distinguish 
between policy advocacy (targeting changes in policy or legislation) and advocacy that 
seeks changes in attitudes and behaviours, and discuss the particular methodological 
challenges in evaluating the former. 
                                                   
1 An exception is the discussion of options set out in a DfID business case, although these would generally not be 
at the level of specific interventions or strategies. 
2 Legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. 
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 Ball (2014, p. 38) comments on the difficulty in measuring governance outcomes, which 
generally require a combination of policy, institutional and behavioural change. Further, 
she cautions that while the outputs of security sector reform may be technically 
satisfactory on paper, they may not achieve their anticipated results if inadequate 
attention is given to facilitating behaviour change. 
3. Conducive policy and legislation as a condition of 
progress 
The first part of the research question concerns the extent to which a conducive policy and legal 
framework is essential to progress. It is based on a scenario in which an agency may have 
identified a policy or law as an impediment to their objectives and therefore assume that they 
should necessarily seek to influence it when in practice it may be challenging to do so; they may 
then question the degree to which they should direct their efforts to this area. The question seeks 
to test this assumption. 
The literature reviewed for this paper does not provide a clear answer. However, it suggests a 
number of factors that might be considered in reaching a decision, which will always be context-
specific (Nathan, 2007). 
The choice of strategy in programme design is an important but secondary question. A 
recent review of the UK Aid security and justice portfolio found that it was most convincing when 
it sought to address specific challenges experienced in particular locations by particular groups, 
and when this was a central feature of the programme (rather than, for example, outsourced to 
NGOs through mechanisms such as challenge funds) (ICAI, 2015, pp. 38-39). The review argued 
that a problem-solving approach to these challenges led more naturally to a broader range of 
partnerships and entry points, and to a multi-disciplinary and multi-layered response in which 
policy, legal and institutional reform might all have their place, alongside direct engagement with 
affected citizens (ICAI, 2015, p. 38). The choice of strategy (in the case of this paper being 
whether and how to pursue policy or legal reform) therefore flows from this analytical process. 
Denny and Domingo (2015) also discuss the use of problem-driven approaches in security and 
justice programming, noting that these can improve both its relevance and effectiveness. 
However, the authors caution that they do not make it more easy, because the deeply political 
nature of security and justice makes these ‘difficult arenas in which to bring about change’ (p.16). 
They raise two other concerns: first, that who defines the problem is also a political issue (p. 6), 
and second, that localised problems are sustained by wider political dynamics and incentives (p. 
10).  
Policy change may be necessary, but it is unlikely to be sufficient. An evaluation of the 
influence exerted by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme noted that policy change 
requires complementary measures, including dedicated resources to implement the policy, a 
framework to monitor its implementation, and significant government buy-in and changed 
practice (WYG, 2017a, p. 55). An evaluation of four of DfID’s state-level programmes in Nigeria 
also found that upstream advocacy (such as the preparation of new legislation) delivered limited 
results without corresponding attention paid to downstream implementation, such as the quality 
and effectiveness of public expenditure (Ecorys et al, 2017, p. 105). 
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The operating context and policy environment may not prove to be as significant an 
obstacle as anticipated. A mid-term evaluation of the Africa Regional Empowerment and 
Accountability Programme,3 whose implementing partners operated in 36 countries, found that 
the external context was not the decisive factor in civil society’s ability to exercise influence on 
policy. While success was more likely in countries where governments create space for non-state 
actors and where the policymaking process is more transparent, these conditions were not 
essential. Rather, effectiveness depended more on the advocacy skills and political 
acumen of the organisations concerned (Coffey, 2015, pp. 24-25). Further, the level of 
commitment to reform is not static, and may rise or fall within the life of a single administration 
(Ecorys et al, 2017, p. 107).  
A sense of realism about the potential for change in uncertain and challenging 
environments is important, but without abandoning long-term goals. The ICAI review found 
that the most convincing programme designs were those that had relatively modest objectives, 
linked to specific problems, rather than those that sought to achieve ambitious institutional 
reforms (ICAI, 2015, p. 15). Booth and Chambers (2014, p. 5) note that political systems are 
shaped almost entirely by domestic forces and historical path dependencies, and therefore that 
the influence of external programmes is likely to be slight. Similarly, Bryden and Chappuis (2015 
p. 4) argue that the opportunities and constraints for reform can only be understood by 
recognising the ‘deep historical currents’ that shape security at the national level. Despite these 
challenges, Eckhard (2016, p. 42) advises donors not to lose sight of the long-term goal of 
democratic control of the security sector, even if it is politically unrealistic in the short term. 
4. Lessons on influencing policy and legislation 
The lessons in this section are drawn from literature that discusses not just the process of 
bringing about a particular policy or legal change, but also the wider enabling environment within 
which such reforms might become possible.  
Local ownership and leadership is key. Reforms are more likely to be sustainable if they are 
shaped and driven by local actors (Nathan, 2007). Laws and regulations are more likely to be 
implemented if they are drafted through a locally supported process, even if this takes time and 
does not entirely meet external expectations (Eckhard, 2016, pp. 31-32). Bryden and Chappuis 
(2015, p. 7) note that the only sustainable shifts in governance of the security sector have been 
with strong national leadership of the reform agenda. A national vision for the security of both 
states and citizens needs to emerge organically, and countries should be given the space to do 
this (Hendricksen, 2010, p. 211). However, one of the implications of local ownership may be 
engaging with organisations which do not share international norms and standards but may still 
enable some degree of long-term influence (Jackson in Bärwaldt, 2018, p. 42).  
Local ownership means national ownership, not just government ownership. In her review 
of security sector reform programmes in Africa since the mid-1990s, Detzner (2017) identifies 
                                                   
3 The programme is concerned with public sector accountability in general, rather than security and justice in 
particular. 
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only three clear examples of success:4 Sierra Leone, South Africa and Ethiopia. Common to all 
three was a high degree of consensus between government and society that significant reform 
was needed and about the priorities for reform. Mobilising local political demand for reform at an 
early stage may therefore be more important for success than external pressure (Jackson, 
forthcoming). 
The role of individuals in effecting change is key. Eckhard (2018) argues that long-term 
change becomes possible when reformers in government rise to positions where they can enable 
systemic change. Those interested in supporting reform therefore need the flexibility and 
preparedness to respond to these opportunities when they arise. Investing in relationships is 
important, but in ways that respect the cultural importance attached to age and seniority 
(Eckhard, 2018, p. 70). In their review of West African experiences of security sector 
governance, Bryden and Chappuis (2015, p. 12) note that a decisive factor in the success of 
reform processes was the disposition of senior leaders in government, who often exercised 
influence through the power of words and dialogue. Albrecht and Jackson (2014, pp. 91-93) 
illustrate the importance of the human factor in Sierra Leone’s security sector reform process. 
First, the head of the Office of National Security was personally influential in ensuring broad 
participation in the review, including by Paramount Chiefs, who have local security 
responsibilities but were often ignored in such reforms. Second, the Sierra Leone team was 
stable over time, compared with the frequently changing UK team, which may have deepened 
local ownership.  
However, personal relationships need some degree of institutionalisation if policy change 
is to be sustained. One of the two factors identified as key to the policy influence achieved by 
the Nigeria Stabilisation and Recovery Programme was the strong relationships built between the 
advocacy platforms and individual champions of change in state institutions. These individuals 
create openings for change which may then be threatened by their subsequent departure. 
Measures which systemise the relationships that have been established are therefore important, 
such as documenting joint strategies and agreements (WYG, 2017a). 
Multi-stakeholder structures can allow mutual interests to emerge. The political economy 
analysis carried out by the Pyoe Pin programme in Myanmar revealed that stakeholders were 
focused on their differences rather than on what they had in common. The programme supported 
the formation of a multi-stakeholder platform, made up of politicians, civil society, government 
officials, lawyers, the private sector, and fisherfolk communities, which subsequently played an 
important role in drafting new fisheries legislation. A similar multi-stakeholder body is now 
working with the ministry on a national policy framework (Christie and Green, 2018). In Nigeria, 
the SAVI programme5 showed that relationships between stakeholders can change in 
unexpected ways. In a non-adversarial setting, where there has been effort to build trust, 
previously unrealised mutual interests may be discovered (Booth and Chambers, 2014, pp. 21-
24). 
                                                   
4 The author uses the term ‘success’ cautiously to mean not the achievement of some final goal, but rather 
‘significant and sustained improvement in day-to-day security conditions for the majority of the people within a 
state when compared to prior conditions’. (Detzner, 2017, p. 123). 
5 The programme is concerned with public sector effectiveness in general, rather than security and justice in 
particular. 
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However, multi-stakeholder platforms are not without risks. While Bryden and Chappuis 
(2015, p. 148) also discuss the importance of dialogue in building trust and shared vision across 
both state and society, they note that civil society should not be assumed to be always a 
constructive partner in reform. Christie and Green (2018, p. 15) provide another cautionary 
note, which is that focusing on aligning incentives between groups (‘win-wins’) may inadvertently 
privilege the powerful and exclude the marginalised within such groups. 
Once mutual interests are established, joint action may become possible. The SAVI 
programme demonstrated the potential in moving away from an adversarial advocacy approach, 
and in so doing it challenged the conventional framing of state-society relations in terms of 
demand and supply. Instead, it facilitated dialogue and collective action between stakeholders on 
the basis of their mutual interests, in some cases across state/society boundaries (Booth and 
Chambers, 2014). This approach has been sustained and refined in the ongoing PERL 
programme in Nigeria,6 which applies a fluid understanding of partnership and works with those 
who demonstrate genuine engagement with an issue, regardless of their institutional profile or 
location. For example, former members of the National Assembly were enlisted to advocate for a 
controversial constitutional amendment on local government autonomy by lobbying Governors 
and members of the State Houses of Assembly (Punton and Burge, 2018, pp. 18-19).   
The assumption that access to information and stronger evidence will lead to policy 
change does not necessarily hold true. The decisive factor may be the nature of the 
relationships built up around a policy issue and the way these are used to effect change (WYG, 
2017a, p. 49). Moreover, the role played by evidence in policy-making is unclear: policy-making 
is rarely ‘evidence-based’, but may be strongly ‘evidence-informed’ if those advocating it act 
effectively (Mayne et al, 2018). 
Careful use of language can help mitigate potential tensions between stakeholders. This is 
particularly pertinent given the sensitivities that surround the security sector. For example, a 
modest and cautious approach characterised the first phase of the Netherlands-funded Security 
Sector Development Programme in Burundi, which initially used the phrase ‘cross-cutting issues’ 
rather than the more politically charged ‘governance’ (Ball, 2014, p. 33). Similarly, staff of the 
Pyoe Pin programme in Myanmar realised that parliamentarians were uncomfortable with 
proposed ‘consultations’ in fishing communities and changed this to the less threatening 
‘hearings’. Once over this hurdle, the politicians came to value these exchanges (Christie and 
Green, 2018, p. 10). 
The sequencing of policy or legal change is important. The literature on security sector 
reform emphasises the importance of taking a holistic approach, and cautions against attempting 
to reform one part of an inter-connected set of institutions. However, careful sequencing then 
becomes important – for example, offering training in security sector oversight to 
parliamentarians and civil society before the policy or legislative change actually grants them 
those powers (Detzner, 2017, p. 124). 
                                                   
6 Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn.  
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5. Examples of policy change 
This section contains four instances of policy change in the security and justice sectors that 
illustrate the lessons discussed in the previous section. 
Developing Nigeria’s National Security Strategy7 
Prior to 2012, Nigeria’s security strategy was narrowly focused and security management was 
regarded as the exclusive remit of the military. This excluded the contribution of traditional and 
religious institutions, civil society organisations, women, and research institutions. By 2016, a 
more inclusive and comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS) had been developed and 
received presidential endorsement, informed by a series of stakeholder discussions. The 
document demonstrated a broader understanding of Nigeria’s multiple security threats and the 
importance of a people-centred approach; it also recognised gender security for the first time. 
These outcomes were the result of a close partnership between the Nigeria Stability and 
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and three organisations: the Office of National Security 
(ONSA), the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), and the National 
Defence College. The NSRP’s contribution was to provide the space where different actors could 
come together and work in a problem-driven and coordinated way. Specifically, it: 
 Engaged influential, committed ‘agents of change’ in NIPSS and ONSA 
 Brought together a wide range of state and non-state stakeholders 
 Enhanced communication and coordination between them 
 Enabled them to better understand each other’s remit. 
The NSRP provided financial and technical support to the process, but it also helped with 
stakeholder and process management, achieving a successful balance between discretion and 
neutrality (in order to secure acceptance) and proactivity (to keep things moving). 
While those interviewed for the evaluation agreed that the policy change implied by the new NSS 
is a positive one, some civil society informants questioned the genuine nature of inclusion. 
Further, sustainability has been undermined by (i) changes to key personnel within government, 
and (ii) the lack of a monitoring plan within the NSS, or action to review it since its launch. 
Domesticating Nigeria’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security8 
The Kano Women’s Peace and Security Network (KWPSN) is one of eight state-level civil society 
networks that aim to domesticate Nigeria’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 
(UN resolution 1325) into state-level policy. Prior to the work of the NSRP and the KWPSN, the 
issue of violence against women was not high on the political agenda and civil society efforts 
were not coordinated. There was a culture of silence around violence against women, and 
negligible prosecutions of cases of sexual violence. 
                                                   
7 Source: WYG International Ltd. (2017a, 11, 50-51), (2017b, 75-90) 
8 Source: WYG International Ltd. (2017a, 11, 48-59), (2017b, 134-154) 
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The issue now has a higher political and media profile in Kano, where the State Action Plan was 
approved in May 2016. The KWPSN, and other civil society actors, used a combination of 
grassroots mobilisation, individual lobbying, media presence, and network-building. The 
evaluation suggests that the decisive factor in achieving change was the nature of the personal 
relationships built up around the issue, rather than the use of evidence. 
However, these relationships tend to be personalised rather than institutionalised. The KWPSN 
positioned itself well to take advantage of a policy window that opened with the appointment of a 
sympathetic Commissioner and Governor in 2015, and was formally incorporated into the 
Implementation Committee for the State Action Plan, chaired by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 
but this window closed again in 2016 when those individuals were replaced. Progress slowed, 
and the resources needed to implement the plan were not allocated. 
This example illustrates that policy changes are fragile, dependent on factors outside the control 
of any programme. Creating the environment to take advantage of favourable conditions when 
they arise – such as maintaining the public profile of an issue, and sustaining civil society 
networks and their relationships with government – is therefore important. 
Civil society participation in Burundi’s Defence Review9 
The security sector development process in Burundi has three pillars: defence, public security, 
and governance. The inclusion of a separate component on governance within an overall SSR 
process was rare; it enabled an exclusive focus on that issue, as well as a mechanism to 
sensitise the other two components (Ball, 2014, pp. 21, 34). 
The government initiated a Defence Review in 2010 and set up a Governance Advisory Group. 
This had two civil society members, both of them organisations experienced in peace and 
security and one of them focused on women. They were able to organise extensive public 
consultations and bring the findings back into the group. The inclusion of civil society actors was 
initially contentious for both security officials and some parliamentarians, given the level of 
secrecy associated with the security sector. However, over time, with expert facilitation and 
dialogue, the quality of interaction changed, leading to greater appreciation of the legitimate roles 
and responsibilities of different stakeholders in creating a secure environment. 
The shift in the relationship between state and society is illustrated by two examples. First, the 
military hosted its first ‘open day’ in 2012, at which the public could visit non-sensitive sites to 
improve understanding. It was followed by an ethics competition the year after, in which 
participating military units had to organise an operation to protect the population against a 
particular threat. In an unprecedented development, the competition was judged by joint teams of 
military officers and civilians from human rights and women’s organisations, rating each unit 
against an agreed set of ethical norms. Second, a Security Sector Reform Network was 
established in 2013, with joint teams (military, police, civil society) introducing the various 
discussion topics at its regular meetings. 
                                                   
9 Schirch with Mancini-Griffoli, 2015, pp. 98-99; Ball, 2014. 
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South Africa’s Defence and Intelligence White Papers 
Nathan (2007) compares two White Papers that were produced within the same broadly 
favourable policy environment (a relatively strong state, democratic system, and civil society in 
post-apartheid South Africa) but that had different outcomes. He identifies five differences 
between the defence and intelligence cases which account for the more positive results achieved 
by the former:10 
i. The level of detail about objectives and strategies in the final document, and 
therefore the extent to which it could guide implementation. 
ii. The nature of the drafting process, and whether this involved different decision-makers 
and allowed their different interests to be resolved. 
iii. The quality of ministerial leadership, and their oversight of the drafting process and 
subsequent implementation. 
iv. The extent of debate and scrutiny by both the public and parliament. 
v. The level of civil society engagement in research and advocacy on the two issues. 
The author cautions that it took eight years to prepare the Defence White Paper, carry out a 
Defence Review, and pass a new Defence Act, in the relatively favourable conditions of post-
apartheid South Africa. In a less favourable policy environment, more time might be needed. 
(Nathan, 2007, p. 15) 
  
                                                   
10 Nathan declares an interest as the chief drafter of the Defence White Paper.  
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